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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of pensions on the distribution of wealth in Finland. We use a 
combination of survey and register data, including register information on earned pension rights. 
We calculate the discounted value of the stream of future pension benefits. Adding pensions to 
net wealth makes the distribution of wealth somewhat more even. Inequality is reduced within 
all subgroups studied. The subgroups whose relative situation improves, compared to other 
subgroups, are the highly educated, singles, and part-time pensioners. We use two samples, 
with the individual and the household as the units of analysis. The differences between the 
results are few and mostly mechanical.
ABSTRAKTI
Tutkimuksessa selvitetään tulevien eläkkeiden vaikutusta varallisuusjakaumaan Suomessa. 
Aineistona käytetään sekä haastattelu- että rekisteritietoja, mukaan lukien rekisteritiedot 
ansaituista eläkeoikeuksista. Tutkimuksessa lasketaan tulevien eläke-etuuksien diskontattu arvo. 
Tulevien eläkkeiden lisääminen varallisuuskäsitteeseen tasoittaa varallisuusjakaumaa hieman. 
Jakauma tasoittuu jokaisen demografisen osaryhmän sisällä. Ryhmiä, joiden suhteellinen asema 
paranee, ovat korkeasti koulutetut, yksinasuvat ja osa-aikaeläkeläiset. 
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1 Introduction
Future retirement benefits are an important form of wealth even for those currently working. 
In US studies, retirement wealth has been calculated to be 22–43% of total wealth (McDermed 
et al. 1989, McGarry et al 1998, Gustman and Steinmeier 1999b). With Canadian data, 
public pension wealth has been calculated to constitute 47% of household entitlement wealth 
(Shamsuddin 2001). 
Although the shares in different countries are not directly comparable because of the 
differences in the pension systems, it is clear that not taking retirement benefit wealth into 
account when studying the distribution of wealth will yield misleading results. 
In the studies, there is no consensus on the effect of retirement benefit wealth on the 
distribution of net wealth. If pension wealth reduces saving, those with a lot of pension 
wealth should have less of other wealth forms. In other words, adding pensions to the wealth 
distribution should make the distribution more even. On the other hand, if income and wealth 
are highly correlated, so should pension wealth be, as benefits are a (non-linear) function of 
income. If this is the case, adding pensions to net wealth should increase inequality.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a) find that pension wealth does not replace saving, but 
instead adds to total wealth. So, according to them, adding pensions to other forms of wealth 
should make the distribution more uneven. McGarry et al (1998) and Shamsuddin (2001), on 
the other hand, find that adding pensions reduces wealth inequality. 
Kennickell and Sundén (1997) find that adding Social Security wealth makes the distribution 
more even. However, the correlation between wealth in DB plans and other wealth is negative, 
but the effect of DC plans is insignificant. Bottazzi et al. (2009) study the development of 
pension wealth after pension reforms in Italy and find that a reduction in pension wealth has 
been met with an increase in other forms of wealth.
In the UK, the earnings-related tier of the pension scheme has been estimated to reduce 
private saving with a substitution elasticity of almost −1.0, while the flat-rate tier does not 
affect private saving (Attanasio and Rohwedder 2001).
In Sweden, the value of the public old-age pensions has been calculated to be over 60% 
of the median gross wealth for blue-collar workers, and over 50% for white-collar workers 
(Andersson et al. 2002). All pension wealth (public plus private) has been calculated to represent 
81% of total gross wealth for the median worker (Andersson et al. 2001). Including pensions 
in the wealth concept reduces inequality, and “the increased uncertainty about future pension 
have increased private investments in pension policies” in Sweden (Klevmarken 2006).
However, the calculation of pension wealth is not without problems. Roine and Waldenström 
(2008) put it this way: “On one hand, it is a fairly well-defined future benefit stream accruing 
to each individual in society that highly influences the incentives of individuals to save for 
retirement. On the other hand, individuals cannot freely access their pension wealth (e.g., to 
realize it before retirement age), which violates one of the fundamental aspects of private 
property rights to personal assets.” There are also practical problems: “First, parts of it are 
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defined in collective form and hence not well-defined for all individuals (or households) in 
the system. Second, the calculation of today’s claims on future pensions concerns a number of 
complex assumptions of people’s life expectancy, future rates of return on the capital markets 
and so forth. Third, there are public and private parts of the pension system, funded and 
un-funded parts, and some of these are more easily observed and measured than others, which 
may create systematic measurement errors in the data….”
So it is not surprising that the previous studies of pension wealth suffer from data limitations. 
No study that we are aware of uses register data on actual earned pension rights. 
For example, McGarry and Davenport (1998) and Kennickell and Sundén (1997) use 
survey data. McDermed et al (1989) and Shamsuddin (2001) have employer or administrative 
information on benefit formulas and rules, but no income histories, and the calculations are 
done by the authors. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2001) calculate the value of pension wealth 
by applying the rules of the pension system to observed individual characteristics. They have 
information on earnings, but no earnings histories nor information on registered pension rights. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a and 1999b) use a matched combination of survey and 
administrative data, but only about 70 percent of the individuals in the survey data set could 
be matched for the administrative information. The authors calculate the benefit values for the 
individuals whose administrative information on plan characteristics and rules are available. 
Bottazzi et al. (2009) calculate the value of pension rights from legislation, based on a number 
of variables but no income histories nor register information on earned pension rights.
This paper studies the distribution of pension wealth in Finland. In this study, we use register 
data on actual earned pension rights. There are no previous Finnish studies on the levels and 
the distribution of retirement benefit wealth. The advantage of Finnish data is the availability 
of register data, so that we have complete information on the actual earned pension rights. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data used. Section 3 presents 
describes pensions as a specific form of wealth. Sections 4 and 5 present the distributions 
of pension wealth at the individual and household levels, respectively. The conclusions are 
presented in section 6. Please note that in order to make the paper readable, only the most 
important results are presented. The complete result tables are available from the author upon 
request. 
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2 Data
For the analysis we combine several data sources: the backbone of the data set is the Household 
Wealth Survey. This survey is collected by Statistics Finland about every five years. We use 
the latest Household Wealth Survey that was collected between February 1st and May 31st of 
2005. The data were mainly collected with household interviews, but in order to economize 
the collection, some of the data comes from registers. For our purposes, the most important 
registered information is the information on net wealth.
The second part of the data, pension register data, has information on earned pension rights 
until the end of the year 2004. In other words, we have register information on what the benefit 
amount would have been if the individual had retired at the end of 2004. These data are from 
two sources: information on earned pension rights in the private sector is from the Finnish 
Centre for Pensions, and municipal pension rights are from the Local Government Pensions 
Institution. The government pension rights were not available, so this study includes individuals 
who have gained their pension rights in the private sector or in the municipal sector1 2. For a 
more detailed description of the data, see Maunu (2007).
Net wealth is measured at household level, while pension rights are calculated at the 
individual level. So how should we treat the net wealth of households with more than one 
adult member? How is net wealth to be divided between household members? Or should we 
treat the household as one economic unit, and take both spouses’ pensions together as well? 
We construct two different samples: an individual sample and a household sample. The 
individual sample consists of 1,457 individuals. The people in the individual sample are either 
the reference person (the person with the highest income) of the household or the spouse of 
the reference person. This restriction has to be made, because some survey questions were 
only asked of the reference person. The people in the individual sample are 45 years old or 
older and not yet retired. The total wealth of a single individual consists of his/her pension 
wealth plus household net wealth, while the total wealth of an individual living with a spouse 
consists of his/her pension wealth plus half of the household net wealth.  
1 In 2006, 6% of the employed were in government employment. 21% were in municipal employment 
and 73% worked for the private sector. In the sample used in this study, excluding the individuals 
who have pension rights gained from government employment reduces the number of individuals 
from 2,102 to 1,457.
2 We also did an experiment where we predicted the values of the pension rights gained in 
government employment. We had accurate information on contract length and accrual percentage, 
but pensionable wage had to be estimated. This was done by running a regression on the available 
pensionable wages (from private sector and municipal employment) on age, year and individual 
dummies (fixed effects). The coefficients from this regression were then used in defining the 
pensionable wage for government employment. The results were similar, whether or not the 
predicted government pension rights were included.
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The household sample consists of 872 households. The household is represented by the 
reference person (the person with the highest income) of the household. So the households 
in the sample are ones where the reference person is 45 years old or older and not yet retired. 
Because the high earners are more likely to be men, there are more “male” observations than 
in the individual sample (62.4% versus 50.2%). The total wealth of a household consists of 
both spouses’ pension wealth (if the household consists of a couple) plus household net wealth. 
For a more detailed description of the samples, see chapter 3.3. and Table A1 in the Appendix.
The distribution of pension wealth in Finland
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3 Pensions as a form of wealth
In this paper, two wealth terms are used: net wealth and total wealth. Net wealth refers to the 
value of real assets (dwellings and recreational residences), transport vehicles, forest and durable 
goods, and financial assets, i.e. all wealth except future pensions. Net wealth is calculated by 
subtracting debt from gross wealth. The information on both gross wealth and debt is from 
registers3. Total wealth is simply net wealth plus pension wealth.
In the data, net wealth is measured on household level, while pension rights are calculated 
at the individual level. So we need to decide whether to take the individual or the household 
as the unit of analysis. 
We construct two samples: a household sample and an individual sample. In the individual 
sample the unit of analysis is the individual and, in order to avoid counting the same wealth 
twice, we need to make assumptions on the division of net wealth within a household. When 
the household consists of a couple, we divide household net wealth by two to get individual 
net wealth. In the household sample, the unit of analysis is the household, whose total wealth 
consists of household net wealth plus both spouses’ pension wealth (in case the household 
consists of a couple).
The pension wealth of an individual consists of the discounted value of the stream of his/
her earned pension rights that were registered in the employment-based pension scheme at 
the end of the year 2004. 
The Finnish pension system consists of two pension schemes, of which the employment-
based scheme is the dominant one. The other scheme, the national pension scheme, is a 
minimum guaranteed pension with income testing. The individual is only entitled to a national 
pension when her employment-based pension falls below a set threshold.4 
The people studied are not yet retired and some expect not to retire in decades. So we need 
to keep in mind that the value of registered pension rights at the end of 2004 will not be equal 
to the value of the benefit the individual will receive at retirement. In most cases, the actual 
benefit will be higher. But some individuals will earn a sufficiently small amount of pension 
rights and will be entitled to the national pension. In other words, the national pension is the 
lower limit of pension benefits – in any case, the individual will receive at least the national 
pension. 
So we take the actual earned pension right, and if it falls below the national pension threshold, 
we include the national pension. If the earned pension rights are above the threshold, we do not 
make any changes. In other words, we do not make assumptions on future earnings. We use 
the wage coefficient to calculate the value of the pension right at the individual’s retirement. 
From retirement until the end of the individual’s life, the value of the pension right develops 
according to the pension index. The stream of benefits is then discounted back to calculate the 
current value of pension wealth. 
3 A more detailed description can be found at http://www.tilastokeskus.fi/til/vtutk/index_en.html.
4 A more detailed description of the Finnish pension system is in Maunu (2007).
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The value of pension wealth depends not only on how large the benefit will be, but also on 
how long the individual will be on the benefit. So we need to make assumptions on two dates: 
retirement and death. 
In the interview, the individuals are asked to provide an expected retirement age5. We use 
this as the beginning of the retirement period. However, if the self-reported retirement age is 
over 68, the individual is assumed to retire at age 686. Life expectancy is expected to vary by 
age, gender and socioeconomic status, according to tables of the Finnish Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health7.
In the calculations, we assume a real earnings growth of 1.75 per cent per year and a 
discount rate of 3 per cent per year. The sensitivity of the results to the choice of the discount 
rate is tested in subsection 4.3.1.
5 98% of the relevant individuals report an expected retirement age. The expected ages vary from 
45 to 85. The mean is 62 years and the median 63 years. Of the reported expected retirement ages, 
32% fall between 60 and 62 years. 52% of the expected ages fall between 63 and 65 years, and 
54% between 63 and 68 years.  
6 The accrual stops at age 68, so in most cases it is optimal to start collecting benefits at that age. 
The individual may still continue working, but he will not earn pension rights anymore. In the 
data, there are 20 individuals who report to expect to retire after age 68.
7 Hannele Palosuo, Seppo Koskinen, Eero Lahelma, Ritva Prättälä, Tuija Martelin, Aini Ostamo, 
Ilmo Keskimäki, Marita Sihto, Kirsi Talala, Elisa Hyvönen and Eila Linnanmäki (eds.) 2007. Health 
inequalities in Finland. Trends in socioeconomic health differences 1980–2005. Publications of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
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4 The distribution of pension wealth at the  
 individual level
We begin by studying the distribution of wealth, with and without pensions, visually. We present 
the mean and median values of wealth, with and without pensions, for various subgroups. 
To study the distribution of wealth among the sample, we use four different inequality 
measures. To study inequality within a subgroup, e.g. the highly educated or the age group 
45-49, we use the 10 / 90 per cent ratio. It is the ratio of wealth held by the individual in the 
10th percentile to wealth held by the individual in the 90th percentile. The larger the ratio, the 
more equally wealth is distributed among the subgroup. However, this ratio does not give any 
information on the distribution between subgroups. 
To study inequality between subgroups, we report the shares of each subgroup falling into 
wealth deciles. The idea behind this measure is that if the distribution was perfectly even, 10 
per cent of each subgroup would fall into each decile, obviously. We are interested in seeing 
which subgroups are under-represented (over-represented) in the lowest (highest) deciles, 
and whether taking a broader wealth concept, that is total wealth including net wealth plus 
pensions, changes the pictures or not.
The last two inequality measures are the shares of pensions in total wealth and Gini 
coefficients.  
Figure 1 shows that adding pension wealth does not change the shape of the wealth 
distribution. The figure presents the individuals in the sample, in order of the value of net 
wealth, from the left to the right. The vertical axis represents the euro values of wealth. The 
solid line represents euro values of net wealth, while the other line represents total wealth, i.e. 
wealth that includes pensions.  
The distribution of pension wealth in Finland
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Figure 1. The distribution of wealth, with and witbout pension. The individual sample.
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4.1 Wealth holdings in euros
Table 1. presents the median and mean values of wealth holdings by subgroup, with and 
without pensions. 
Subgroup Net wealth, median  
(euros)
Pension wealth, 
median (euros)
Pensions as a 
share of total 
wealth (medians)
Whole sample 99,014 89,024 47%
Men 102,546 86,458 46%
Women 95,475 90,618 49%
Age: 45−49 89,904 76,465 46%
Age: 50−54 104,104 89,767 46%
Age: 55−59 106,275 104,222 50%
Age: 60−68 125,243 102,651 45%
Labour market status: working 103,579 89,871 47%
Labour market status: not working 54,652 67,793 55%
Part-time pensioner 151,461 123,336 45% 
The median value of pension wealth in the whole sample is almost 90,000 euros, while the 
median value of net wealth is approximately 100,000 euros. So taking pensions into account 
almost doubles the value of wealth holdings for the median person. 
There is no statistical difference between the holdings of net wealth of men and women. 
Men’s pension wealth is higher than women’s, because of their higher earnings, although the 
median is higher for women. 
The distribution of pension wealth in Finland
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With regard to age, the youngest age group, not surprisingly, has a lower value of pension 
wealth than the other age groups. This is because they have the shortest working careers. The 
age group with the highest pension wealth is the 55−59-year-olds. They are near retirement, 
they have a long income history, and can expect to enjoy their benefits for a longer time than 
the oldest age group, whose life expectancy is shorter. 
Net wealth increases with age as well. While the median value of net wealth for the 
45−49-year-olds is approximately 90,000 euros, the median for the 60-68-year-olds is 
approximately 125,000 euros. However, even though net wealth increases with age, pension 
wealth increases even more, so that the share of pensions in total wealth increases with age. 
Not surprisingly, those not working have considerably less pension wealth than those 
working and part-time pensioners.  
The median value of pension wealth for men is 81% of the mean value, while for women 
the median is 90% of the mean. So pension wealth is more evenly distributed among women 
than it is among men. There is also more variation among the oldest age group, for whom 
the median is 79% of the mean, than among the other age groups (84–92%). With regard to 
labour market status, pension wealth is most unevenly distributed among those not working, 
for whom the median is 82% of the mean, compared to those working and part-time pensioners 
(86% for both subgroups). 
4.2 Distribution measures in the individual sample
In this subsection, we study the distribution of pension wealth in the individual sample via 
four distribution measures. 
4.2.1 10/90 % ratio
The 10/90% ratio is a way of studying the changes in wealth inequality within subgroups. It 
is the ratio of the wealth holdings of the person in the 10th percentile to the wealth holdings 
of the person in the 90th percentile. The smaller the ratio, the more unequal the distribution.
Table 2 studies inequality within subgroups via the 10/90 per cent ratio. The tables show 
that all the 10/90% ratios are greater when pensions are taken into account than when only 
net wealth is considered. So the distribution with pensions is more even than the distribution 
without. This result holds for all subgroups. For the whole sample, inequality is reduced by 
17 percentage points when pensions are added. 
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Table 2. Inequality and 10/90 per cent rations by subgroup. The individual sample.
Subgroup 10/90% ratio,  
net wealth
10/90 ratio,  
pension wealth
10/90% ratio, total 
wealth
Change in 
10/90% ratio 
when pensions 
are added (per-
centage points)
Whole sample   6% 33% 22% +17%
Education: low   1% 41% 23% +22%
Education:  
intermediate
  7% 38% 24% +17%
Education: high 11% 26% 24% +13%
Labour market 
status: working
  9% 34% 25% +16%
Labour market 
status: not  
working
  0% 32% 15% +14%
Part-time  
pensioner
10% 31% 23% +13%
The change in the 10/90 per cent ratio, when pensions are added to net wealth, is positive for 
all subgroups. So inequality, as measured by the 10/90 per cent ratio, is reduced within all 
subgroups when pensions are added. 
The subgroup within which inequality is reduced most is those with low education. In other 
words, adding pensions reduces the variation in wealth most within the low-educated group. 
4.2.2 The shares of observations in wealth deciles
The relative status of the subgroups is studied below in table 3.
Table 3. Shares falling into certain wealth deciles by subgroup, with and without pensions. 
The individual sample.
Subgroup Share in 
lowest 
10% by 
net wealth
Share in 
lowest 
50% by 
net wealth
Share in 
highest 
10% by 
net wealth
Share in 
lowest 
10% by 
total wealth, 
pension 
included
Share in 
lowest 50% 
by total 
wealth
Share in 
highest 
10% by total 
wealth
Singles 28% 62% 10% 21% 60%   9%
Couples   7% 48% 10%   8% 48% 10%
Labour market 
status: working
  7% 48% 10%   7% 48% 10%
Labour market 
status: not working
33% 67%   6% 35% 71%   4%
Part-time  
pensioner
  2% 38% 18%   0% 24% 26%
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Table 3 studies the shares falling into certain wealth deciles by subgroup. If the distribution 
was perfectly even, the share falling in each wealth decile would be 10% in all subgroups. 
This clearly is not the case. For example, the shares falling into the lowest decile of net wealth 
vary from 2% for the part-time pensioners to 33% for those not working.
The subgroup whose relative situation is affected most when pensions are added is singles 
compared to couples. Their share in the lowest decile drops by 7 percentage points when 
pensions are added. For single women, the drop is even larger, 10 percentage points. The 
relative situation of the highly educated improves somewhat, as does the situation of the older 
age cohorts. Education and wealth are positively correlated: the highly educated are more 
likely to be in high wealth deciles, both with and without pensions. However, their situation 
further improves when pensions are taken into account. The older age cohorts have a longer 
working history than the younger ones, so it is not surprising that their situation improves when 
pensions are added. The relative situation of those not working weakens somewhat, while the 
situation of part-time pensioners improves. 
4.2.3 Gini coefficients
The Gini coefficient for net wealth is .486, while for total wealth (including pensions) it is 
.379. So the Gini coefficients suggest that net individual wealth is less equally distributed. In 
other words, adding pension wealth seems to make the distribution a little more even. 
Table 4 presents the Gini coefficients for net wealth, pension wealth and total wealth. 
Table 4. Gini coefficients for net wealth, pension wealth and total wealth (net + pension 
wealth). The individual sample.
Subgroup Gini coefficient,  
net wealth
Gini coefficient, 
pension wealth
Gini coefficient,  
total wealth
Change in Gini  
coefficient when 
pensions are dded
Whole sample .4864 .2633 .3414 -.1450
Men .4765 .2944 .3475 -.1290
Women .4955 .2284 .3349 -.1606
Singles (both  
genders) 
.6349 .2417 .4073 -.2276
Couples (both 
genders) 
.4600 .2666 .3293 -.1307
Age: 45−49 .5201 .2042 .3564 -.1637
Age: 50−54 .4674 .2368 .3281 -.1393
Age: 55−59 .4694 .2672 .3173 -.1521
Age: 60−68 .4360 .3394 .3439 -.0921
Labour market 
status: working 
.4533 .2513 .3157 -.1376
Labour market 
status: not  
working 
.6970 .2793 .4822 -.2148
Part-time  
pensioner
.4469 .2834 .3232 -.1237
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The highest Gini coefficients for net wealth are among singles and those not working. So net 
wealth is most unevenly distributed among these subgroups. The Gini coefficient for pension 
wealth is highest for the oldest age cohort, i.e. pension wealth is most unevenly distributed 
among the oldest cohort. 
For all subgroups, the Gini coefficients are smaller for total wealth than wealth, i.e. adding 
pensions makes the distribution of wealth more even for all subgroups. The subgroups for 
whom the Gini coefficient decreases most when pensions are added are the same subgroups 
among whom net wealth is most unevenly distributed: singles and those not working. 
4.2.4 The share of pensions in total wealth  
“… pension wealth, without a doubt, is the single most important asset for the majority of 
Swedes” (Röstberg et al 2005). Pension wealth represents 81% of total gross wealth for the 
median worker, and for the lowest wealth decile, wealth consists almost exclusively of pensions 
(Andersson et al 2001).  
In this subsection, we show how the share of pensions in total wealth (net wealth + pensions) 
varies by subgroup in Finland. We begin by studying the variation visually. We then present 
the shares for each subgroup, and regression results for the share of pensions in total wealth.
The distribution of pension wealth in Finland
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Figure 2. Share of pensions in total wealth by net wealth. The individual sample. (Note: the 
x axis is cut at 1,000,000.)
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Figure 2 shows that the share of pensions in total wealth is decreasing in net wealth. 
Pensions make up 49% of total wealth for the median person in the sample. Please note that 
in this paper, we study the share of pensions in total net wealth, while Andersson et al. (2001) 
study total gross wealth. So we cannot conclude that the share of pensions in total wealth is 
different in the two countries. What we can conclude, however, is that in both countries pensions 
have a great effect on wealth levels, especially in the lower deciles. Just like in the Swedish 
study, also in Finland total wealth consists almost exclusively of pensions for the least wealthy 
decile. Pensions make up 97% of total wealth for the lowest decile, when the sample is divided 
into deciles of equal size by amount of non-pension wealth. For the wealthiest decile, pensions 
present a much smaller but still considerable 22% of total wealth. 
There is also a difference in the shares held by single persons and couples. The share of 
wealth that singles hold in the form of pensions is significantly higher. In other words, singles 
have either more pension wealth or less net wealth than couples, or both. Please note that we 
have divided the household wealth by two for couples to get individual wealth, so the reason 
for couples being wealthier cannot be that there are two adults in the household. 
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FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS          19
To study the subgroups for which pensions make up the most significant shares of total wealth, 
we run a regression on the share of pension pensions in total wealth. The results are presented 
in table 5. 
Table 5. Regression results. The share of pensions in total wealth. The individual sample.
Variable Coefficient Standard error P value
Gender: male .012 .015 .413
Education: low Ref.
Education: intermedi-
ate
-.033 .019 .086
Education: high -.056 .020 .006
Age: 45−49 Ref.
Age: 50−54 -.025 .018 .151
Age: 55−59 .013 .020 .517
Age: 60−68 -.083 .030 .005
Family status: couple -.096 .023 .000
Labour market status: 
working
Ref.
Not working .076 .027 .005
Part-time pensioner .010 .039 .796
Two subgroups stand out in the regression results. The highly educated have a smaller share 
of pensions, or, in other words, a higher share of net wealth. This is perhaps surprising, as 
in the last section we noted that the relative situation of the highly-educated improves when 
pensions are added.  Similarly, the relative situation of the oldest age cohort was in the last 
section noted to improve when pensions are added, and still they actually have a smaller, not 
higher, share of pensions in their total wealth.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we study the sensitivity of the results presented above to the choice of the 
discount rate and retirement age. 
4.3.1 Discount rate
We have assumed that the discount rate is 3 per cent. Table 6 presents the euro values of 
wealth under three different discount rates. The sensitivity of the results to the choice of the 
discount rate is, not surprisingly, very high. Increasing the discount rate from 2% per year to 
4% per year almost halves the median discounted value of pension wealth. However, only the 
magnitudes of wealth are affected, not the shape of the distribution. Simply put, changing the 
discount rate means multiplying the values by a different number.
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Table 6. The distribution of wealth, with and without pensions. Three discount rates. The 
individual sample.
Net wealth Pension wealth, 
discount rate 2%
Pension wealth, 
discount rate 3%
Pension wealth, 
discount rate 4%
Mean 137,629 134,775 103,453 79,897
Median   99,014 118,076   89,024 67,540
Total wealth, as it is defined in this paper, consists of net wealth and pension wealth. Changing 
the discount rate only affects the value of pension wealth, and the value of net wealth is 
unaffected. Pension wealth is more equally distributed than net wealth, so changing the discount 
rate only affects the part of wealth that is more equally distributed. 
When the discount rate increases, we discount the future with a higher coefficient – so the 
euro value of pension wealth decreases. This means that with a higher discount rate, the part 
of wealth that is more equally distributed will present a smaller share of total wealth. As the 
share of wealth that is more equally distributed decreases, the distribution of total wealth gets 
more unequal. 
However, the effect of a change of the discount rate from 2% to 4% is quite small. The 
10/90 per cent ratios are for total wealth are only some percentage points higher in the 2% case 
than in the 4% case. So the differences are not large, and they are of equal magnitude for all 
subgroups. Also the results on shares of subgroups falling into wealth deciles and the shares 
of pensions in total wealth are almost identical, whichever rate of return is used.  
The Gini coefficient for net wealth is .484 and for total wealth, including pensions, in the 
3% rate of return case it is .341. The Gini coefficients for total wealth with different discount 
rates are .322 (discount rate 2%t) and .361 (discount rate 4%). In other words, increasing the 
discount rate increases the Gini coefficient, but the change is of little magnitude. 
We can conclude that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. 
4.3.2 Retirement age
Above, we have let the individuals choose their retirement age themselves. If wealth and health 
are correlated, it is possible that the individuals with good health and a high level of wealth 
are also those who plan to postpone retirement. We cannot test this because we do not have 
information on the individuals’ health. 
Using US data, Samwick and Skinner (2004) study the effect of lowering the retirement 
age from 62 years to 55 years and find that the median value of the yearly benefit is reduced 
by 44–51%. 
In the Finnish data used here, the variation of self-reported expected retirement ages is 
small. 23% of the sample expect to retire at age 60, 23% at age 63, and 26% at age 65. Only 
5% expect to retire before age 58, and only 3% after age 65. But even though the expected 
retirement ages are quite concentrated, it is possible that that there is a correlation between 
net wealth and expected retirement age.
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We test the sensitivity of the results to retirement age by changing the assumption on retirement 
age: here we assume all individuals will retire at age 63. The individuals who are over 63 and 
working are assumed to retire immediately. All other assumptions are as in the previous sections.
The 10/90 per cent ratios are almost exactly the same as in the case where the individuals 
may choose their retirement age. Also the shares of individuals falling into wealth deciles, as 
well as the regression results on the share of pensions in total wealth, are almost identical to 
the results in the previous sections. 
The Gini coefficient for total wealth is .3416, i.e. also very close to the one in the case 
where the retirement age can be chosen by the individual (.3414).
We conclude that the results are not sensitive to the assumption on individual retirement 
age. This is because variation in the expected retirement ages is small. Compared to the seven-
year reduction in retirement age used in Samwick and Skinner (2004), the changes from a 
self-reported retirement age to age 63 are smaller, and thus the effect here is much smaller 
than in the US study. 
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5 The distribution of pension wealth at household  
 level
Pensions are awarded to an individual, so their distribution is best described at the individual 
level. This is what has been done in the previous section. However, in our data, net wealth is 
calculated at the household level. So, in order to compare pension wealth to net wealth, we 
have to make assumptions about the division on household wealth between the members of 
the household. In the previous section, we have been assuming that wealth is equally divided 
between spouses. This may or may not be the case in reality.
Atkinson (2007) shows the effect of the individual distribution of wealth to the distribution 
at the household level. Suppose the individual distribution is such that the top 1% of individuals 
own 10% of all wealth in the economy. Assume further that all the individuals in the top 1% 
are single or their spouses have zero wealth. With the assumptions that Atkinson makes, the 
share of wealth that the top 1% of households own will be 11.8%, i.e. somewhat larger than 
the share at the individual level. 
On the other hand, if all the people in the top 1% are married to each other, and the spouses 
have the same amount of wealth, the share of wealth held by the top 1% of households will 
be somewhat smaller than the share held by the top 1% of individuals. With Atkinson’s 
assumptions, the share will be 8.3%. So the division of wealth within a household matters to 
the distribution of wealth in the economy as a whole. 
In this section, we take the household, not the individual, as the unit of analysis. This strategy 
has been used in McGarry and Davenport (1998). We add couples’ pension wealth together 
to form household pension wealth. So the unit studied is not the individual but the household. 
To avoid counting the same wealth twice, we drop one of the spouses of each household from 
the sample. So the household sample studied here consists of single persons and the reference 
persons of the household, where the household consists of a couple (with or without children). 
The sample size falls from 1,457 to 872.
There are some differences between the household sample and the individual sample. 
Obviously, in the household sample, there are more singles than in the individual sample. The 
share of men is also greater in the household sample. This is because we have included only 
the member of the household with the highest income to represent the household, and the high 
earners are more often men than women. 
With regard to age and education level, the samples are quite similar. The share of those not 
working is smaller in the household sample than in the individual sample. For a more detailed 
description of the samples, see table A1 in the Appendix.
All 10/90 per cent ratios are equal or smaller in the household sample than in the individual 
sample. In other words, the within-subgroup distributions are more unequal when couples’ 
wealth is added together.
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In the whole household sample, the 10/90 per cent ratio for net wealth is 4 percentage points 
smaller than in the whole individual sample. When pensions are included in total wealth, the 
10/90 per cent ratio is 6 percentage points smaller in the household sample than in the individual 
sample. For all subgroups, with and without pensions, the 10/90 ratios are equal or smaller in 
the household sample than in the individual sample. So the assumption that couples’ wealth 
is divided equally makes the distribution more even, and abandoning that assumption creates 
a more unequal distribution.
The Gini coefficients are .497 for net wealth and .336 for total wealth. In the individual 
sample they were .486 for net wealth and .341 for total wealth.
The shares falling into certain deciles are very similar, with only minor differences in the 
household sample and in the individual sample.
Not surprisingly, in the household sample, the shares of singles falling into lower wealth 
deciles are larger. For example, the share of singles in the lower half of the wealth distribution 
of net wealth is 14 percentage points larger (62% versus 76%). When total wealth is studied, 
in the household sample, 80% of singles fall in the lower half of the distribution, compared 
to 60% in the individual sample.  
The subgroup whose relative status is weaker in the household sample than in the individual 
sample is those not working. For total wealth, the shares falling into the lowest decile and into 
the lowest half of the distribution are 10 and 15 percentage points higher than in the individual 
sample (35% versus 45% and 71% versus 86%, respectively).
Finally, table 7 presents the regression results for the share of pensions in total wealth in 
the household sample. There are two differences in these results, compared to the ones in the 
individual sample.
In the individual sample, there was no significant difference between genders. In the 
household sample men’s share of pensions in total wealth is lower than women’s. However, 
please note that “men” and “women” do not refer to identical observations in the two samples. 
In the individual sample, obviously, “men” and “women” refer to men and women. In the 
household sample, on the other hand, “men” refers not only to single men but also to the (whole) 
households where the highest earner is a man. Similarly, “women” refers to households where 
a woman is the highest earner – whether or not there are other people living in the household. 
Here couples’ share of pensions in total wealth is lower than in the individual sample 
(coefficients −.180 and −.096, respectively). This change is purely mechanical, though. In the 
individual sample we divided the net wealth of couples by two to get individual wealth, so 
in the household sample net wealth is twice the amount it was in the individual sample. The 
household is represented by the highest earner, whose pension is also likely to be highest, so 
adding the other spouse’s pension less than doubles the amount of pension wealth. The share 
of pensions in total wealth is thus less than it was in the individual sample.
The distribution of pension wealth in Finland
24          FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS
Table 7. Regression results. The share of pensions in total wealth. Couples’ total wealth, in-
cluding pensions, is added together. 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P value
Gender: male -.044 .021 .038
Education: low Ref.
Education: intermediate -.026 .026 .311
Education: high -.053 .027 .049
Age: 45−49 Ref.
Age: 50−54 -.027 .025 .267
Age: 55−59 .006 .027 .838
Age: 60−68 -.104 .041 .011
Family status: couple -.180 .025 .000
Labour market status: working Ref..
Not working .138 .047 .003
Part-time pensioner .030 .043 .480
So we can conclude that the results are not sensitive to the assumption that couples’ wealth is 
divided equally. Most of the results are similar, whether we use the individual or the household 
sample. The differences between the results in the two samples are few and mostly mechanical, 
that is, based on the differences between the two samples8.
8 More detailed results are available from the author upon request.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of pensions on the distribution of wealth. We use a combination 
of survey and register data, including register information on net wealth and earned pension 
rights. We calculate the values of future pensions as the discounted value of the stream of the 
earned pension rights. 
Net wealth is measured at household level, while pension rights are calculated at the 
individual level. So we need to decide on which unit of analysis we are going to take. Taking 
the individual as the unit of analysis, if the household consists of a couple, we divide household 
net wealth by two to get individual wealth. On the other hand, looking at households instead 
of individuals, we calculate the total wealth of a household by adding both spouses’ pensions 
to household net wealth.
We construct two samples: an individual sample and a household sample. The individual 
sample consists of 1,457 individuals, while the household sample consists of 872 households. 
In both samples, either the individual or the reference person of the household is 45 years old 
or older and not yet retired. 
In both samples, adding pensions to net wealth makes the distribution somewhat more 
even. We study the effect of adding pensions to net wealth both within subgroups and between 
subgroups.
In the individual sample, inequality is reduced within all subgroups when pensions are 
added. The subgroups within which inequality is reduced most are those with low education 
and part-time pensioners. The subgroups whose relative situation (compared to other subgroups) 
improves when pensions are added are singles (compared to couples), the highly educated, 
and part-time pensioners. However, the relative situation of those not working weakens when 
pensions are added.
The results are not sensitive to the choice of the discount rate nor to retirement age. Obviously 
the values of pension wealth are different in magnitude when different discount rates are 
assumed, but the signs and qualitative interpretations do not change. When all individuals are 
assumed to retire at age 63, the results are very similar to when the individuals are assumed 
to retire at their self-reported expected retirement age.
The household sample results are similar to the ones in the individual sample, but with 
some minor exceptions. All within-subgroup distributions are either similar or somewhat more 
unequal in the household sample than in the individual sample. So the assumption that couples’ 
wealth is divided equally (as is done in the individual sample) makes the wealth distribution 
more even, and abandoning that assumption creates a more unequal distribution.
In the household sample, the relative status of couples compared to singles is improved, 
compared to the individual sample. However, this change is purely mechanical, i.e. based on 
the differences between the samples, and not surprising. A subgroup whose relative status is 
weaker in the household sample than in the individual sample is those not working. Otherwise 
the results are similar to the ones in the individual sample. 
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Appendix
Table A1. The samples used in this study.
Subgroup Number of  
observations in 
individual sample
Share in  
individual sample
Number of  
observations in 
household sample
Share in  
household sample
Whole sample 1457 100% 872 100%
Men   732 50.2% 544 62.4%
Women   725 49.8% 328 37.6%
Singles  
(both genders) 
  211 14.5% 211 24.2%
Couples  
(both genders) 
1246 85.5% 661 75.8%
Single men     90 6.2% 90 10.3%
Single women   121 8.3% 121 13.9%
Men in couple   642 44.1% 454 52.1%
Women in couple   604 41.5% 207 23.7%
Education: low   437 30.0% 271 31.1%
Education:  
intermediate 
  618 42.4% 365 41.9%
Education: high   402 27.6% 236 27.1%
Age: 45−49   500 34.3% 304 34.9%
Age: 50−54   437 30.0% 259 29.7%
Age: 55−59   405 27.8% 243 27.9%
Age: 60−68   115 7.9% 66 7.6%
Labour market 
status: working 
1229 84.4% 767 88.0%
Labour market 
status: not  
working 
  178 12.2% 76 8.7%
Part-time  
pensioner
    50 3.4% 29 3.3%
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